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SHOWCASING DIVERSITY* 
PATRICK S. SHIN** & MITU GULATI*** 
Diversity initiatives are commonplace in today’s corporate America. 
Large and successful firms frequently tout their commitments to 
diversity, sometimes appointing women and racial minorities to highly 
visible posts, including seats on their boards of directors. Why would a 
profit-minded firm go out of its way to engage in such behavior? One 
frequently voiced explanation is that by creating such diversity, firms 
send out a positive signal about their attributes: a firm’s willingness to 
expend resources on diversity shows its commitment to workplace 
fairness and equality, which makes it more attractive to potential 
employees, customers, and financiers. This claim has considerable 
surface appeal not only as an explanatory thesis, but as a rationale that 
conveniently bridges the normative gap between corporate self-interest 
and the promotion of social justice. In this Article, we raise some 
difficulties with the theory of diversity-as-signal in terms of both its 
explanatory adequacy and its normative implications. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Large firms in the United States today appear to regard 
increasing the diversity of their workforces as an important goal.1 
Corporations like Verizon, Intel, and Walmart tout their diversity 
initiatives on their websites.2 CEOs look to add diversity among 
senior managers, law firms seek to add diversity in their partnership 
ranks, and universities seek diverse candidates to install as deans and 
chancellors. Observers and analysts, meanwhile, stand ready to rank 
these institutions on these efforts—presumably to meet a marketplace 
demand for such information.3 Diversity has become a matter of 
corporate strategy4 and even of concern to financial markets.5 Yet, at 
 
 1. According to a recent survey of Fortune 500 companies, some ninety-five percent 
of those polled said that senior management viewed increasing workforce diversity as a 
“major goal.” National Survey Reveals Workplace Diversity Is Critical in Attracting and 
Retaining Talent, CUNA HUMAN RES. / TRAINING & DEV. COUNCIL (Oct. 1, 2009), 
http://www.cunahrtdcouncil.org/news/3131.html. 
 2. In an April 2010 news release, Verizon boasted that it had been named by 
Diversity MBA Magazine as “among the top companies for board of directors’ diversity” 
and that “[w]omen and people of color constitute nearly half of Verizon’s Board of 
Directors, and . . . nearly 60 percent of the company’s workforce.” Verizon Ranked No. 4 
on Diversity MBA Magazine’s List of Best Companies for Diverse Managers, VERIZON 
NEWS CENTER (Apr. 20, 2010), http://newscenter.verizon.com/press-releases/verizon/2010/ 
verizon-ranked-no-4-on.html. For websites containing similar content, see Diversity, 
WALMARTSTORES.COM, http://walmartstores.com/diversity/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2011) 
and Intel Diversity, INTEL, http://www.intel.com/about/companyinfo/diversity/index.htm 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2011). 
 3. See, e.g., Sonia Alleyne & Annya M. Lott, 40 Best Companies for Diversity: They 
Want You!, BLACK ENTERPRISE, July 2010, at 92, 94–100, available at 
http://www.blackenterprise.com/diversity/2010/06/15/they-want-you/; Luke Visconti, The 
2010 DiversityInc Top 50 Companies for Diversity, DIVERSITYINC, June 2010, at 18, 18, 
available at http://www.diversityinc-digital.com/diversityincmedia/201006#pg1. The 
companies listed in these rankings frequently tout their high position in the rankings on 
their websites. See, e.g., Black Enterprise Includes Marriott in Top “40 Best Companies for 
Diversity,” MARRIOTT NEWS CENTER (June 29, 2010), http://news.marriott.com/2010/06/ 
black-enterprise-includes-marriott-in-top-40-best-companies-for-diversity.html; Black 
Enterprise Names MGM Resorts International to List of Nation’s “40 Best Companies for 
Diversity,” MGM RESORTS INT’L (July 7, 2010), http://www.mgmresortsdiversity.com/ 
press_releases_07_17_10.asp; Burger King Corp. Named One of “40 Best Companies for 
Diversity” by Black Enterprise Magazine, BURGER KING INVESTOR REL. (Aug. 27, 2010), 
http://investor.bk.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=87140&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1464427 
&highlight=; Toyota Named Among Best Companies for Diversity by Black Enterprise, 
TOYOTA USA NEWSROOM (June 28, 2010), http://pressroom.toyota.com/pr/tms/toyota-
named-among-best-companies-161014.aspx.  
 4. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerialization of 
Law, 106 AM. J. SOC. 1589, 1590 (2001); Tristin K. Green, Race and Sex in Organizing 
Work: “Diversity,” Discrimination, and Integration, 59 EMORY L.J. 585, 595–97 (2010); 
Erin Kelly & Frank Dobbin, How Affirmative Action Became Diversity Management: 
Employer Response to Antidiscrimination Law, 1961 to 1996, 41 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 960, 
972–74 (1998). 
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the same time, ongoing research in social psychology suggests that 
negative attitudes toward members of racial minority groups are 
pervasive, persistent, and often imperceptible to the very individuals 
who possess them.6 And looming in the background is uncertainty 
about the implications of recent developments in employment 
discrimination law for the legal permissibility of affirmative efforts to 
enhance workplace diversity.7 So, what explains the contemporary 
enthusiasm for diversity? 
One of the explanations given by corporate board members 
themselves is that diversity efforts send a positive message about their 
institutions—for example, that their companies are headed in the 
right direction, are socially responsible, or care about egalitarian 
norms and social justice.8 Diversity is, according to this rationale, 
desirable as a signal of a socially upstanding corporation.9 
 
 5. The Securities and Exchange Commission has recently mandated that companies 
disclose whether they consider diversity as a factor in selecting their board members. See 
17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi) (2010) (requiring as part of Regulation S-K the disclosure of 
how diversity is considered in the process by which candidates for director are considered 
for nomination); see also Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,343 
(Dec. 23, 2009) (noting with approval arguments that “disclosure about board diversity . . . 
would provide investors with information on corporate culture and governance practices 
that would enable investors to make more informed voting and investment decisions,” 
“that there appears to be a meaningful relationship between diverse boards and improved 
corporate financial performance, and that diverse boards can help companies more 
effectively recruit talent and retain staff”). 
 6. See generally Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The 
Critical Role of Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 
1893, 1895–98 (2009) (describing instances of unconscious discrimination); Anthony G. 
Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. 
REV. 945, 952–53 (2006) (describing the Implicit Association Test which suggests that 
Americans have an implicit or unconscious “attitudinal preference” for Caucasians over 
African Americans); Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral 
Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1072–75 (2006) 
(describing studies linking implicit attitudes with discriminatory behavior); Linda 
Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to 
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1213–16 
(1995) (describing studies that support the conclusion that discrimination results from 
unconscious cognitive biases). 
 7. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Note, Grutter at Work: A Title VII Critique of 
Constitutional Affirmative Action, 115 YALE L.J. 1408, 1447–48 (2006) (analyzing Grutter 
v. Bollinger and the use of affirmative action in the workplace); Michael J. Zimmer, Ricci’s 
Color-Blind Standard in a Race Conscious Society: A Case of Unintended Consequences? 
35–40 (Dec. 29, 2009) (unpublished draft), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=1529438 (analyzing Ricci v. DeStefano and the implications of the “color 
blind” standard for discrimination law). 
 8. See Lissa Lamkin Broome & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Signaling Through Board 
Diversity: Is Anyone Listening?, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 431, 432 (2008). 
 9. E.g., Green, supra note 4, at 598 (according to the prevailing business narrative, 
“[r]ace and sex are relevant primarily as means of serving markets and of signaling a 
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In this Article, we examine this signaling rationale for the pursuit 
of corporate diversity.10 After explaining the basic idea behind the 
signaling thesis, we explore some difficulties with it. By observing a 
distinction between the condition of diversity and explicit behaviors 
that signal attitudes about diversity, we propose a modified version of 
the signaling thesis that more plausibly identifies the explicit 
behaviors that perform a genuine signaling function in connection 
with workplace diversity. Finally, we set forth normative and legal 
objections to the signaling rationale as a justification for diversity 
hiring and contrast it with other consequentialist grounds of 
justification. We argue that thinking of diversity in terms of its 
signaling function potentially undermines the genuine, good reasons 
that we have for valuing the presence and development of diversity in 
institutional contexts. 
I.  DIVERSITY AS A SIGNAL 
A. The Value of Diversity 
From the perspective of a philosophical theory of value, there 
are at least two ways in which we can think of the value of racial 
diversity in a firm’s workforce.11 First, we might think of its value as 
primarily instrumental in nature; that is, as a function of its usefulness 
in the service of further ends, but not as something valuable in itself. 
Valuing diversity in a workforce because of its expected positive 
consequences for worker productivity, morale, or responsiveness to 
customers are examples of valuing diversity in an instrumental way.12 
Second, we can also think of diversity as having noninstrumental 
value; in other words, as something that is itself worth caring about, 
regardless of any further consequences that it might tend to 
produce.13 For example, we might believe that diversity is constitutive 
of the good of a community, or that valuing diversity in various 
 
commitment to diversity and adherence to egalitarian norms and laws”). 
 10. For skepticism regarding other arguments in favor of focusing resources on 
achieving racial diversity at the top of an institution rather than at the bottom, see Devon 
W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Race to the Top of the Corporate Ladder: What Minorities Do 
When They Get There, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645, 1662 (2004) (theorizing that 
diversity in corporate governance “will neither racially reform the corporation, nor” open 
doors “for the minorities on the bottom”). 
 11. See generally Patrick S. Shin, Diversity v. Colorblindness, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1175 
(comparing the respective value of racial diversity and “colorblindness”). 
 12. See id. at 1191–95. 
 13. See id. at 1183–84. 
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institutional settings is a necessary concomitant of being committed to 
a certain ideal of justice or equality.14 
Most people who care about diversity probably do so for a 
variety of reasons, both instrumental and noninstrumental. The topic 
of interest to us here is one particular theory of the value of 
diversity—the evidential or signaling theory—that is best 
characterized as an instrumental one.15 In limiting our discussion to 
this particular theory, we do not wish to suggest that other 
approaches to conceptualizing the value of diversity, including 
noninstrumental ones, are unimportant or, for that matter, immune 
from criticism.16 We focus on the signaling theory of the value of 
diversity because it seems to have explanatory power in the context of 
the economics of the workplace,17 yet at the same time is sufficiently 
underdeveloped as to reward some searching inquiry. 
In Parts I.B and I.C, we explain some basic concepts from 
signaling theory generally, and then describe how that theory might 
be adapted to help explain why rational actors might attach positive 
value to the presence of diversity in the workplace. 
B. Signaling: Basic Concepts 
The notion of a signal is intuitively familiar. Many decisions in 
the workplace depend on judgments about characteristics of people 
and institutions that are difficult to observe or demonstrate directly 
and cannot reliably be discerned by straightforward inquiry or report. 
Consider a characteristic as basic as the propensity to work hard. 
Employers naturally have reason to favor employees who are hard 
 
 14. See id. at 1199–1201. 
 15. See id. at 1195–99. 
 16. See, e.g., Carbado & Gulati, supra note 10, at 1662. See generally Shin, supra note 
11, at 1199 (presenting arguments for and against valuing racial diversity in a 
noninstrumental way). 
 17. For discussions of the signaling rationale for diversity initiatives from a variety of 
other perspectives, see generally Carol T. Kulik & Loriann Roberson, Diversity Initiative 
Effectiveness: What Organizations Can (and Cannot) Expect from Diversity Recruitment, 
Diversity Training, and Formal Mentoring Programs, in DIVERSITY AT WORK 265, 274 
(Arthur P. Brief ed., 2008) (reviewing the research on diversity and concluding that 
“presenting diverse employees and pro-diversity statements in recruiting materials sends a 
signal to the applicant that the organization values diversity”); Toyah Miller & María del 
Carmen Triana, Demographic Diversity in the Boardroom: Mediators of the Board 
Diversity-Firm Performance Relationship, 46 J. MGMT. STUD. 755 (2009) (using signaling 
theory to understand the relationship between board diversity and firm performance); 
Valerie Purdie-Vaughns et al., Social Identity Contingencies: How Diversity Cues Signal 
Threat or Safety for African Americans in Mainstream Institutions, 94 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 615 (2008) (suggesting that a firm’s diversity can send signals to specific 
subgroups, such as African Americans). 
SHIN.PTD 3/30/2011  10:12 AM 
1022 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
 
workers, and employees have reason to convince their employers that 
they are. But a propensity for hard work is not something that can be 
directly observed, and any claim by an employee to be a hard worker 
would be too self-serving to be reliable. Thus, an employee who 
wants to communicate her propensity for hard work to her employer 
(maybe she is in a probationary position or is seeking a promotion) 
will have to figure out ways to send signals—clear, reliable 
messages—that provide evidence of that characteristic.18 She might, 
for example, regularly stay late at the office or show up early 
(depending on when there are others present to observe these 
actions). She might send work-related e-mails in the early hours of 
the morning or produce reports that are voluminous and exhaustive. 
These are discrete, directly observable behaviors that tend to 
evidence an underlying general propensity to “work hard,” which is 
itself a vague, context-dependent concept that resists specification. 
The visible behaviors, therefore, can serve as signals of the more 
abstract underlying characteristic.19 
Not all signals have the same quality or value. There are negative 
signals as well as positive signals, weak signals as well as strong ones.20 
Context is important. Behavior that is intended to send a particular 
signal may not always succeed in doing so. For example, sending 
work-related e-mails late at night to colleagues may simply annoy 
them, especially if they suspect that there is no substance underlying 
the attempted signal. Staying late at the office on a consistent basis 
when the work in question can be completed in a relatively short time 
might indicate that the employee is slow. Producing unnecessarily 
voluminous reports might suggest that the employee has bad 
judgment.21 
Signals can also perform different functions. Some, which might 
be called separation signals, are aimed at setting the sender apart 
 
 18. The form of intentional, strategic behavior we are discussing here is a somewhat 
specialized case of signaling. For a more general discussion of signaling, see ERIC A. 
POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 18–27 (2000). For an analysis of “signaling systems” 
in nature, see BRIAN SKYRMS, SIGNALS: EVOLUTION, LEARNING, & INFORMATION 22–
32 (2010) (describing how certain behaviors by vervet monkeys can be understood as 
signals warning of the presence of various types of predators). 
 19. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 
1259, 1260–63 (2000). 
 20. E.g., John G. Riley, Weak and Strong Signals, 104 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 213, 
214 (2002). 
 21. In other words, the actual informational content of a signaling behavior may be 
different from what the sender of the signal intends to communicate through that 
behavior. See SKYRMS, supra note 18, at 9, 44–45. 
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from others.22 Serving a tennis ball at 100 mph is, for example, a signal 
that someone has athletic prowess at tennis. Not anyone can do this, 
and probably no one can do it without significant athletic ability and 
training. The signal, therefore, when sent early in a game, can 
communicate that the player will be an especially worthy and 
formidable opponent. The signal is reliable because only those with a 
certain level of skill and athletic prowess can send it. Wearing an 
Armani suit and driving an exotic sports car can similarly serve to set 
someone apart; one typically cannot perform those actions unless one 
has money, and lots of it.23 
Other signals are meant to demonstrate that the sender is similar 
to others. If almost everyone who works in a certain office goes out 
for drinks on Friday evenings at a particular bar, a new employee 
might choose to take part in that ritual to signal that he is collegial 
and values the others’ camaraderie. Or the employee might choose to 
participate simply to avoid sending the opposite signal; that is, a lack 
of collegiality and possible disaffection. 
In economic terms, signals work most effectively when they are 
relatively cheap to send if one possesses the underlying characteristic 
and expensive to send if one does not possess the characteristic.24 
Consider again the behavior of staying late at the office on a regular 
basis as a signal of a propensity to work hard. That is an example of a 
good signal. A lazy, leisure-loving person will find it painful to stay 
late at work on a regular basis, so sending the signal would be 
prohibitively costly for him. The compulsive employee who obsesses 
over her work, on the other hand, will attach little personal cost (and 
perhaps will derive pleasure from) arranging to spend extra time at 
the office, so the opposite would be true for her. 
Almost any kind of behavior can function as a signal,25 but there 
are at least two features that all effective signaling behaviors share. 
First, the behavior must be something that is clearly identifiable (e.g., 
staying at work after hours), compared to the more amorphous 
underlying characteristic (e.g., the propensity to work hard) that the 
behavior is supposed to signal. A behavior is worthless as a signal if 
 
 22. See POSNER, supra note 18, at 20–22. 
 23. For discussions of “costly signaling,” see, for example, John G. Riley, 
Informational Equilibrium, 47 ECONOMETRICA 331, 331–60 (1979); Stephen Ross, The 
Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive Signaling Approach, 8 BELL J. ECON. 
23, 23 (1977). 
 24. For a discussion of classic signaling, see Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 
Q.J. ECON. 355, 355 (1973). 
 25. See SKYRMS, supra note 18, at 7 (“Signals are not endowed with any intrinsic 
meaning.”). 
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the behavior is obscure or difficult to observe. Second, the signaling 
behavior must be difficult or costly to exhibit in the absence of the 
underlying characteristic that it is supposed to evidence.26 If anyone 
can engage in the behavior easily, it will not be a reliable indicator of 
any underlying characteristic in particular. 
Although the foregoing discussion focuses on signaling behavior 
by individuals, institutions and groups can engage in such behavior as 
well. The same kinds of incentives that drive signaling behavior in the 
individual context apply in the group context. For example, a 
company might want to communicate to current and prospective 
employees that it is a compassionate employer, promotes work-life 
balance, or is patriotic. An employer could, of course, simply tell 
observers that it has those characteristics, but again, that kind of self-
serving declaration is not likely to be effective: talk is cheap. Thus, an 
employer who wanted observers to believe that it has those kinds of 
characteristics might engage in signaling behavior that reliably 
evidences them. For example, offering to pay funeral expenses when 
the parent or spouse of an employee has passed away might be an 
effective signal of compassion. Setting up daycare facilities for 
employees with young children might effectively signal a belief in 
work-life balance. Making contributions to a veteran’s fund might 
signal patriotism. And so on. 
C. The Signaling Rationale for Diversity 
What if an employer wanted observers to perceive it as a 
company that fosters a workplace governed by progressive norms of 
equality and nondiscrimination under which everyone has a fair 
opportunity to succeed, regardless of factors such as race or gender? 
Projecting such an image might benefit the employer by making it 
easier to recruit employees and perhaps gain customers and business 
partners.27 But “norms” are intangible abstractions, and commitment 
to a norm is not a state that can be directly perceived by or exhibited 
to observers. One might hypothesize that a desire to communicate a 
commitment to socially progressive norms is something that would 
drive signaling behavior. How, then, might a corporation signal a 
 
 26. See Spence, supra note 24, at 358–59. 
 27. To borrow from Eric Posner, the employer would be signaling that it had a low 
discount rate for the future; that is, that it was in the game for the long term and, as a 
result, would play fair. POSNER, supra note 18, at 15–21. For an application of this concept 
in the diversity context, see Laura Nyantung Beny, Diversity Among Elite American Law 
Firms: A Signal of Quality and Prestige 23–26 (Feb. 24, 2007) (unpublished draft), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=777504. 
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commitment to equality or antidiscrimination norms—that is, that it 
has a “positive diversity climate,” to borrow a helpful term from Tom 
Tyler?28 
Recent literature discussing why corporations are actively 
pursuing the creation of diversity on their boards of directors posits as 
a primary reason that the existence of such diversity serves a valuable 
signaling function.29 The idea is that corporate board diversity helps 
differentiate the institutions that have it from those that do not.30 The 
signaling thesis is that corporations seek to establish diversity on their 
boards to demonstrate their commitment to qualities such as fairness, 
justice, and equality of opportunity.31 In economic terms, an 
institution that is willing to spend extra resources to pursue diversity 
in its upper echelons, including its board, is signaling that it has an 
ethos of fairness and justice. Conversely, an institution that fails to 
achieve such diversity might be signaling its disregard of or 
indifference to such norms.32 
For diversity to function effectively as a separating or 
differentiating signal, it must be the case that institutions who care 
more about fairness and justice will find it cheaper to pursue diversity 
than those institutions that care less about these characteristics. This 
argument about differential costs, when unpacked, is questionable.33 
Broome and Krawiec, in a study of the signaling rationale for board 
diversity, find little indication that board diversity helps to 
differentiate companies with true commitments to fairness and justice 
(or some other similar concept) from those with less dedication to 
 
 28. See Jennifer K. Brooke & Tom R. Tyler, Diversity and Corporate Performance: A 
Review of the Psychological Literature, 89 N.C. L. REV. 715, 745 (2011) (characterizing 
“positive diversity climate” as including “[i]nterpersonal respect, a proactive attitude 
towards diversity, the promotion of an overarching organizational identity, and respect for 
subgroup identities”). 
 29. See Broome & Krawiec, supra note 8, at 447–48. 
 30. See id. 
 31. See id. 
 32. A recent article in the mainstream press discussed the lack of diversity in high-
level posts in New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s administration, stating that 
[m]any employers want a workplace . . . that has highly qualified managers who 
reflect the broader community . . . . So failing to name minority employees to high-
level positions, time after time, not only can dampen employee morale, but also 
send a message that an employer is insensitive or indifferent, according to political 
analysts and human resources professionals. 
David W. Chen & Jo Craven McGinty, Setting Diversity as Hallmark, Mayor Falls Far 
Short of a Vow, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2010, at A1. 
 33. See Broome & Krawiec, supra note 8, at 448–52. 
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those values.34 Board diversity is easy to mimic, they explain, which 
means that it likely has little value as a signal of a genuine 
commitment to fairness and justice.35 
One response to this difficulty with the signaling thesis is to 
reframe just what it is that diversity is supposed to signify. One might 
argue that a diverse board or a diverse workforce is not a separation 
signal, but rather a signal of social cooperation, a signal that a 
company is aware of and endorses extant progressive norms of 
nondiscrimination and fair equality of opportunity. Thus, firms may 
engage in behaviors promoting diversity not to differentiate 
themselves from other firms, but simply to signal that they are also 
one of the “good types,” thereby avoiding any negative inference of a 
desire to dissociate themselves from those other firms. 
We are getting ahead of ourselves. Whether or not the signaling 
thesis about the corporate interest in diversity can withstand scrutiny, 
the fact is that it has a great deal of surface plausibility. In the 
interviews reported in a series of papers by Broome, Conley, and 
Krawiec, board members themselves frequently give a signaling 
rationale for why corporations have reason to make their boards of 
directors more diverse.36 Broome, Conley, and Krawiec express 
skepticism about how well this explanation holds up.37 We are also 
skeptical, but for different reasons. Specifically, the signaling thesis 
presupposes that the fact of diversity itself functions as a signal of 
underlying attributes that observers have reason to care about. But 
the notion of diversity has an ineffable quality about it; it is a concept 
that resists specification or bright-line definition. If that is so, is 
diversity even the sort of thing that can sensibly be thought of as a 
signal in the sense we have been discussing? An examination of the 
signaling thesis about corporate diversity should start by examining 
whether diversity as such is the sort of observable state that can 
function as a signal in the first place. 
 
 34. See id. 
 35. See id. at 451–52. 
 36. Lissa L. Broome, John M. Conley & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Dangerous Categories: 
Narratives of Corporate Board Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 759, 792–93 (2011); John M. 
Conley, Lissa L. Broome & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Narratives of Diversity in the Corporate 
Boardroom: What Corporate Insiders Say About Why Diversity Matters, in DISCOURSE 
PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript 
at 19–20), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1415803. 
 37. See Broome et al., supra note 36, at 804–08; Conley et al., supra note 36, at 19–20. 
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II.  DIVERSITY AS SIGNAL:  A CRITIQUE 
In the preceding Part, we laid out the hypothesis that employers 
and observers have reason to care about the existence of diversity in a 
workforce because that state of affairs signals an employment context 
characterized by fair equality of opportunity and, more generally, an 
ethos of justice and equality.38 In this Part, we consider some 
difficulties with this hypothesis. 
“Diversity” is not a technical term. Everyone understands 
basically what is meant by the claim that a particular workforce is 
diverse or has an absence of diversity. The trouble for the signaling 
thesis, however, is that it is difficult to identify concrete, determinate 
conditions that would unfailingly cause us to recognize a given 
population as diverse. We can, to be sure, say some general things 
about what constitutes diversity. Diversity with respect to a given 
characteristic is a property of a group of people that describes the 
group’s heterogeneity with respect to that characteristic. If a group is 
completely homogeneous, it cannot be diverse. The less 
homogeneous it is, the more diverse it will be. But the diversity of a 
group can be itself multifarious, such that a group can be diverse with 
respect to one characteristic yet not diverse with respect to another. 
And diversity of course admits of degrees, so a group can be more 
diverse in a given respect compared to a second group, yet less 
diverse in that same respect compared to a third. 
None of this should seem particularly controversial. But when we 
try to move from these basic generalities toward more specific 
definitional conditions, the going gets quite a bit more difficult. One 
obvious problem is that it is impossible to say what degree of 
heterogeneity with respect to a characteristic must exist before we can 
say that a group has diversity in that respect. It is true that sometimes, 
when we talk about diversity, we are referring just to the presence of 
any level of heterogeneity in a group. Diversity in this minimal 
descriptive sense, though, could not possibly be regarded as evidence 
of operative norms of equality and nondiscrimination. So the notion 
that diversity is a signal of operative norms of fairness and 
nondiscrimination implicates a more robust concept of diversity. It is 
that more robust concept that resists determinate specification. 
The problem, however, is not just that there is some 
indeterminacy as a result of vagueness (lack of sharp boundaries) as 
to the limits of diversity. It is also that judgments about the diversity 
 
 38. See discussion supra Part I. 
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of a group seem dependent on somewhat mercurial details of context. 
For example, if the workforce of a large company headquartered in 
an urban locale with a twenty percent black population were ninety-
five percent white, we might be inclined to say that the company 
lacked racial diversity, and we might say that this is so because the 
proportion of whites to racial minority groups does not reflect the 
proportion observed in the broader community. Yet, if that same 
workforce in the same locale were, just to throw out a number, forty 
percent black, we would probably say that the company had a great 
deal of racial diversity, even though the proportion of white to black 
employees still would not match the proportion observed in the 
broader community. 
Once we notice the context-dependent nature of judgments 
about diversity, similar examples become simple to concoct. Suppose 
a Fortune 500 company had a predominantly black rank-and-file 
employee base, with an all-white managerial team and an all-white 
board of directors. One might not be willing to call such a company 
racially diverse. Yet, if that same company had a predominantly white 
rank-and-file with a predominantly black management team and 
majority black board of directors, we would guess that many would 
regard that firm as having a significant degree of racial diversity. How 
would we characterize a workforce that had a sizable number of racial 
minority employees, if all of those minorities happened to be Asian? 
Would such a workforce exhibit racial diversity? Even as to sex, 
where one would think that diversity could simply be defined by 
reference to a 1:1 ratio, matters seem hardly so straightforward. If 
thirty percent of the composition of a coal-mining operation were 
women, we might say of that company that it had an unusually high 
degree of gender diversity, while that same percentage would 
probably be thought to reflect low gender diversity on a law school 
faculty. 
We can also imagine some more fanciful cases. Suppose a 
company happened, by chance, to employ a sizable number of 
workers, relative to the relevant labor market, who identified 
themselves as white but due to their skin color, ancestry, and social 
cues would be regarded by most strangers as black. Would we say 
that those workers contributed to the company’s racial diversity? 
What about the opposite case, in which those same workers identified 
themselves as black but would be regarded by most strangers as 
white? Would we then say of the company that it had racial diversity? 
It is not immediately apparent how one ought to answer these 
questions—one’s response will depend on how one thinks about the 
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significance of self-identification in the meaning of race—but what we 
want to observe is that the question whether this hypothetical 
company possesses racial diversity is not one that can be answered 
without some nuanced attention to a number of embedded issues. 
Put simply, the meaning of diversity is hard to pin down.39 It 
seems quixotic to attempt to identify the truth conditions of claims 
about whether a group of people is diverse in any particular respect. 
One might be tempted to say that it is possible to know a diverse 
workforce when one sees it, but that seems patently false if one takes 
even a few of our hypothetical snapshots above seriously. 
For the theory of diversity as a signal, the difficulty is rather 
acute. Once we recognize that we cannot say of diversity that “we 
know it when we see it,” it becomes unclear how a group’s putative 
diversity could function as an effective signal of any underlying state. 
If no one can even say exactly what it means for a group of people to 
exhibit diversity, then how could any putative exhibition of that 
property be a reliable indicator of anything? 
As explained above, a particular trait, characteristic, or behavior 
has value as a signal of some underlying referent state or 
characteristic when that characteristic is itself something we care 
about, the signal is reliably correlated with it, and the signal is both 
easier to exhibit and to identify than the referent characteristic itself.40 
For example, a student’s grade point average (“GPA”) in college has 
value as a signal of an underlying set of referent attributes—let us say 
intelligence, diligence, responsibility, and motivation—because GPA 
is itself a fact that is much easier to advertise and identify than any of 
those attributes.41 It is not at all clear, however, that something similar 
can be said of the characteristic of race and gender diversity. Whether 
or not a group is diverse is itself a contestable matter subject to 
significant disagreement in some or perhaps even most cases. 
Part of the difficulty here is that the concept of diversity is not a 
purely descriptive one, but one that may also have a normative 
component. One might argue that what “diversity” truly refers to is 
the kind and degree of heterogeneity that we would expect to see in a 
 
 39. Tellingly, a recent report based on a survey by the Society for Human Resource 
Management concluded that “[w]hile organizations tend to believe that diversity in the 
workplace is important, only 30% [of those surveyed] have an agreed definition of 
‘diversity.’ ” Few Organizations Define Diversity, HRM GUIDE (Mar. 4, 2008), 
http://www.hrmguide.com/diversity/job-market.htm. 
 40. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 41. And because GPA is not something that can easily be “faked,” the risk of GPA 
being a false signal is low. 
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group if that group had been created under ideal conditions 
consistent with justice, fair equality of opportunity, and adherence to 
antidiscrimination principles.42 On this normative understanding of 
the meaning of diversity, the claim that a workforce is racially diverse 
cannot be verified through simple, direct observation. It implies that 
the group’s composition is roughly in line with what we would predict 
it to be under certain hypothetical conditions of justice, social 
equality, and the absence of local discriminatory practices.43 Those 
are obviously normatively loaded concepts, and determining those 
hypothetical conditions requires normative work. 
In discussions about the significance and meaning of diversity, we 
must be careful to avoid slipping in and out of this normative 
understanding of the concept. This sort of equivocation may explain 
part of the intuitive plausibility of the signaling thesis about the value 
of diversity. The thesis, again, is that the diversity of a workforce 
functions as a signal, and that the referent state being signaled is that 
the employer does not engage in discrimination and is committed to 
norms of fairness and equality of opportunity.44 But if “diversity” is 
understood in the normative sense just described, then the thesis is 
nearly tautologous. That is, if diversity by definition refers to the kind 
and degree of heterogeneity that would be present under ideal 
conditions of justice and nondiscrimination, then the assertion that 
diversity is a signal of such conditions becomes just a trivial truth that 
falls out of its definition—something like saying that a well-balanced 
baseball team is a “signal” that the team has good offense, defense, 
and pitching. 
If it is plausible to posit diversity as evidence of fairness and 
equality just because we implicitly understand diversity to mean 
heterogeneity as would exist under conditions of fairness and 
equality, then the signaling thesis is empirically vacuous. It has the air 
of truth because of the conceptual connection between diversity and 
conditions of equality justice, but this conceptual connection also 
disqualifies the property of diversity as such from serving as a 
genuinely useful, information-bearing signal (in the stricter sense of 
that term) of those conditions. Because of diversity’s normative 
component, we cannot even know whether a given group is diverse 
unless we can first determine what the composition of the group 
would be under ideal conditions of justice and nondiscrimination. 
 
 42. See PETER SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA 20 (2003) (distinguishing between 
“normative” and “descriptive” definitions of diversity). 
 43. For a discussion of the definition of “diversity,” see generally id.  
 44. See discussion supra Part I.C. 
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Once we realize this, it makes little sense to theorize diversity as such 
in the role of an evidentially valuable, indirect signal of a state of 
justice and equality. 
In summary, when we reflect on the vagueness of the notion of 
diversity and its character as a normatively loaded construct, it starts 
to seem wrongheaded to postulate the putative diversity of a group as 
an effective, information-bearing signal of some further, less visible 
state of affairs. The property of diversity seems different from the sort 
of readily identifiable traits or discrete behaviors that function as 
signals in classic examples. 
III.  AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL 
So diversity is a vague, partly normative, abstractly constructed 
concept that does not admit of easy definition. Whether or not a 
particular group of people can properly be described as racially or 
otherwise diverse is sometimes difficult to answer and might be a 
matter of considerable disagreement. It may be impossible to state 
with any precision the truth conditions of the assertion that a group is 
or is not diverse in any given respect. 
Yet, despite these conceptual difficulties with the theory of 
diversity as a signal, it is undeniable that employers engage in 
practices that seem motivated by a desire to advertise the presence of 
women and minorities in their workforces, such as appointing an 
individual to a highly visible post such as the board of directors, or 
prominently featuring images of minority personnel on the corporate 
website or in promotional materials.45 How should these practices be 
understood? If we are not being careful, we might be tempted to say 
that these cases are examples of companies making use of diversity to 
signal something desirable about them as employers, vendors, or 
business partners; that is, to signal to others that they are one of the 
“good types.”46 
In fact, however, the concept of diversity as such is not essential 
to a description of what it is that these employers are exhibiting or 
putting on display. The employer who prominently features black 
employees in its promotional brochures or on its website is in some 
general sense advertising its diversity, but it would be a mistake to say 
that the employer was exhibiting diversity directly. Exhibiting an 
image of an individual who might contribute to the company’s 
diversity is not equivalent to exhibiting the company’s diversity. 
 
 45. See, e.g., supra notes 2–3. 
 46. POSNER, supra note 18, at 18–27. 
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Similarly, a company who places a racial minority on its board of 
directors might be motivated by an interest in causing others to form 
beliefs about the company’s diversity, but having such a person on the 
board neither constitutes diversity nor the exhibition of diversity as 
such—it is nothing more than the exhibition of an individual member 
of a minority group associated with the company, which might or 
might not actually enjoy diversity among its constituents. 
This simple observation exposes a significant difficulty for the 
thesis that diversity functions as a signal of some underlying state. 
When a company tries to tout its commitment to progressive norms 
by spotlighting particular individuals who are women or racial 
minorities, diversity as such is not the characteristic that is 
spotlighted, and it is far from certain that observers will perceive the 
spotlighted subject as diversity per se. This suggests that thinking of 
diversity as a signal involves confusion. 
To see the confusion, consider an analogy to a signaling system 
involving a homeowner’s display of an American flag on his porch on 
the Fourth of July. It is straightforward to think of the flag as a signal 
for some referent set of characteristics of the homeowner, perhaps 
including patriotism and civic pride. We can quibble about the 
specifics of what is signaled and how effective that signal is, but a flag 
is clearly the sort of thing that can function as a signal. Assuming the 
flag is displayed properly and viewing conditions are satisfactory, 
there should be no uncertainty about the display that relates to 
potential disputes about what it is for something to be a flag, nor 
should there be any problem of uptake. Except in unusual cases, 
whether something is a flag will not be an open question, and 
everyone who notices the flag will perceive it as a flag. 
Notice how different the property of diversity is from this 
canonical example of the flag-as-signal. Indeed, if we try to map the 
property of diversity onto the flag example, it makes much more 
sense to think of the analogue to diversity not as the flag (the signal), 
but rather as one of the referent attributes, such as patriotism. 
Patriotism has a level of vagueness and indeterminacy that is similar 
to diversity. Like the concept of diversity, the value of patriotism 
might be connected with the value we might place on the underlying 
traits we associate with it, such as loyalty and pride. But it would be 
unhelpful to conceive of patriotism as a signal for those traits, because 
it is too vague and abstract to be the sort of thing that could function 
as a signal at all. There is no clear way to exhibit it directly, as there is 
no distinct behavior that, if noticed, will necessarily be perceived as a 
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display of patriotism as such. Much the same can be said about 
diversity. 
Diversity, inasmuch as it corresponds to something like 
patriotism in the flag analogy, is not the sort of thing that can function 
as a signal. This does not mean, however, that the kinds of 
employment behaviors we tend to associate with “diversity hiring”—
such as hiring minority personnel to fill visible posts or placing their 
images on the corporate website—cannot be explained in terms of a 
signaling model. The questions for the application of a signaling 
model to these examples, though, are: what exactly is functioning as 
the signal (like the flag), and what exactly is the referent state being 
signified (like patriotism)? 
Our proposed answer is that the employer behavior that 
constitutes the signal is the prominent hiring, placement, or 
presentation of individuals who are visibly identifiable as women or 
members of racial minority groups. We will use the term 
“showcasing” as a shorthand to refer to these practices by which an 
employer makes its women and minority constituents visible or 
otherwise salient to observers. Showcasing behavior can take various 
forms. The practices we have in mind include the featuring of images 
of minority personnel in the employer’s promotional materials, such 
as brochures and websites. Another example would be the 
appointment of a minority to a prominent position in the company, 
such as an executive post or the board of directors. Showcasing also 
includes verbal claims about the significance of women and minorities 
in its company, or the publication of statistics that emphasize the role 
or presence of such personnel. Our notion of showcasing includes, in 
short, actions that feature, spotlight, publicize, or otherwise exhibit 
the presence of individuals who would typically be regarded as 
increasing a group’s diversity. 
If showcasing is the signaling behavior, what state of affairs does 
that behavior evidence? We propose that the referent state that an 
employer’s showcasing behavior signals is a certain level of geniality 
toward members of the showcased individual’s group and a certain 
kind of sensitivity or attitude about diversity in general.47 We might 
 
 47. Our claim about what is signaled by showcasing is similar to Brooke & Tyler’s 
claim that “if a company structures itself to treat all employees fairly and sends social 
signals [to minority employees] emphasizing fairness . . . research has found increases in 
performance and ‘organizational commitment,’ and decreases in turnover rates and 
absenteeism.” Brooke & Tyler, supra note 28, at 732–33. Like Brooke and Tyler, we are 
inclined to take a deflationist view to characterizing what exactly is signaled by an 
employer’s diversity-oriented practices. The value of diversity in general is surely tied to 
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say that an employer’s showcasing of its minority constituents is in a 
sense a second-order signal—a signal about its attitude toward 
diversity, which (where it can be identified as such) might in turn 
provide evidence that the employer is committed to norms of equality 
and antidiscrimination. But it is the way in which the employer 
showcases and presents the role of minority employees, officers, and 
directors within its workforce that performs the explicit signaling 
function, not the actual condition of diversity or lack thereof. What 
the employer’s showcasing behavior signals, specifically, is (1) the 
ability to make itself attractive to individuals who would contribute to 
diversity, such as members of the showcased individual’s minority 
group; (2) a disinclination to engage in openly discriminatory 
employment action; and (3) a sensitivity to the significance of 
diversity. 
It would not be unfair to ask us at this point exactly what kind of 
claim we think we are making here; and if it is an empirical one, 
whether we have evidence to support it. We do not think we can deny 
that ultimately, we are indeed making an empirical claim (as opposed, 
say, to a definitional or purely logical one) about what can be inferred 
from the behavior we have labeled as showcasing. It is a very limited 
sort of empirical claim, though, with a distinctly interpretive 
character. We are not making outright claims about employer 
intentions or motivations generally. Our claim about the content of 
the showcasing signal is an attempt to identify the most robust 
inferences about an organization’s attitudes with respect to the value 
of diversity, equality, among others, that can reliably (i.e., more-or-
less inexorably) be drawn from any given observed instance of 
showcasing behavior. Some might think that we are being too 
cramped or stingy, maybe even cynical, in the inferences we are 
prepared to allow. Recall, though, that our underlying objective is to 
identify what is reliably signaled by a particular corporate behavior. 
In order to do that, we must necessarily try to imagine the possibility 
of intentionally disingenuous behavior. Some might also wonder 
whether our claims are nothing more than appeals to common 
intuition. But signals by their nature must work through common 
understandings, so it does not seem to us particularly worrisome that 
we do indeed rely on our own considered reflections in arriving at 
possible interpretations of the various kinds of behaviors we are 
 
the value of justice and equality, but we doubt that an employer’s decision to showcase 
minorities, even at the upper echelons of its workforce, can really be regarded as more 
than a relatively minimal signal of a certain disinclination to discriminate and mindfulness 
about diversity issues. 
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considering. In the end, we fully recognize and accept that the 
authoritativeness of the empirical, interpretive claims we are 
articulating will ultimately depend on nothing more—and nothing 
less—than their being shared by readers after reflection.48 
Shifting the weight of the signaling function from the fact of 
diversity to the employer’s showcasing behavior does not require 
denying that diversity may be evidentially valuable as an indicator of 
a commitment to certain norms of equality. Thus, we fully agree that 
we have reason to value diversity in the workplace insofar as we care 
about the conditions and circumstances that are usually required to 
produce it (and hence are evidenced by it). What we resist is the 
appeal to the signaling value of diversity as an explanation of 
employer practices in the nature of showcasing. Our proposal is to 
turn the notion of diversity-as-signal upside down. The property of 
diversity has a widely shared significance, and yet is vague, normative, 
and contestable. Our model thus casts diversity as a value that drives 
signaling behavior, rather than as a signal itself. What we are calling 
showcasing is an example of behavior that can function as a signal of 
the employer’s attitudes about diversity. The key move is to 
distinguish behaviors such as showcasing, which signal diversity and 
attitudes about diversity, from the conditions that would actually 
constitute diversity. Teasing apart these concepts allows for a 
signaling model that more adequately explains employer behavior. As 
our discussion below will show, these distinctions also create space for 
a clearer, more critical analysis of the signaling rationale for diversity-
related employment practices. 
Distinguishing behaviors that signal diversity from the condition 
of diversity itself implies that one can exist without the other. This is 
of central importance to our signaling model. An employer can 
engage in signaling behavior with regard to diversity, such as 
showcasing, whether or not the employer actually has a workforce 
that enjoys significant diversity. If we are right in arguing that general 
claims about diversity are normatively loaded and difficult for 
observers to test, one might think that almost every employer with at 
least some diversity will have an interest in engaging in showcasing 
behavior (assuming there is a benefit to be gained by communicating 
its diversity efforts to outsiders). But if all employers have an interest 
in showcasing, and if the actual diversity of a workforce is very 
difficult for an observer to determine independently, the obvious 
 
 48. We are grateful to Tristin Green for pressing us to consider these issues. 
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question is how showcasing behavior could come to have any value at 
all as a reliable signal. 
The answer is that in our proposed signaling model, the referent 
state that is evidenced by the showcasing signal is a sufficiently 
minimal characteristic that the ability to send the signal is indeed a 
reliable proxy for that characteristic. We are not claiming that 
showcasing behavior functions as a signal of the existence of robust 
diversity or even of an employer’s genuine interest in achieving 
diversity. It would be all too easy for an employer to engage in 
showcasing behavior even in the absence of such conditions.49 What 
we claim, to repeat, is that showcasing behavior signals (1) an ability 
to attract members of the showcased individual’s minority group, (2) 
a certain disinclination to engage in open discrimination against that 
group, and (3) a sensitivity or concern on the employer’s part for its 
reputation as an institution that supports diversity in respect of that 
group. 
This is not a signal that seems particularly prone to “faking.” Not 
every employer can send the showcasing signal. If an employer has 
the ability to perform a showcasing signal, it will probably also have 
the three attributes that we claim are putatively signaled. First, an 
employer cannot engage in showcasing unless it actually has minority 
personnel to showcase. This will require that the employer make itself 
sufficiently attractive to such individuals to induce them to accept a 
position. If it succeeds, it follows that the employer has the ability to 
attract such individuals to its workplace community. Relatedly, an 
employer who expends resources to make itself attractive to, and then 
to showcase members of a particular minority group is not likely to 
throw away the benefits gained by those expenditures by turning 
around and openly discriminating against that same group.50 
And third, an employer that was not sensitive to its reputation 
for diversity would be unlikely to understand or take seriously the 
need to showcase its minority personnel and so probably would not 
 
 49. See Broome & Krawiec, supra note 8, at 451. 
 50. This does not rule out the possibility that the employer would do so in hidden or 
unintentional ways. A striking example of this unfortunate possibility is the recently 
publicized Novartis story. See Novartis Fined $250 Million in Sex Discrimination Suit, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 20, 2010, at B3. Over a long period of time, Novartis built up a reputation of 
hospitability toward women in its workplace and was recognized as one of the best 100 
companies for ten years running by Working Mother magazine. Id. Yet, in a federal 
discrimination lawsuit brought by a number of female employees, a jury found that the 
company had engaged in a pattern and practice of intentional discrimination against 
women during that same period and awarded the plaintiffs $3.3 million in compensatory 
damages and $250 million in punitive dames. Id. 
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make the effort to do so. Granted, an employer could engage in 
showcasing without having any genuine interest in diversity, but it is 
harder to imagine why an employer who had no concern for its 
reputation regarding diversity would do so. An employer that 
opposed having a positive reputation for diversity would in all 
likelihood lack sufficient numbers of minority personnel to showcase 
effectively, would find the notion of showcasing too distasteful to 
countenance and therefore would not engage in it, or might simply 
not want to make itself attractive to those who would perceive 
minority showcasing as a positive signal. 
It is possible, to be sure, that an employer might engage in 
showcasing with respect to a particular minority individual without 
meaning to advertise the individual’s minority status, and without the 
specific purpose of enhancing its diversity reputation: perhaps the 
employer is simply proud of the individual being showcased. But it is 
in the nature of a signal that an employer can engage in signaling 
behavior without specifically intending to communicate the 
correlated referent attributes. Whether or not the behavior is an 
effective signal for those attributes depends only on whether the 
behavior actually increases the probability that the sender (witting or 
unwitting) does in fact possess those attributes.51 So, what about the 
employer who sends the showcasing signal without having the 
purpose of drawing attention to the showcased individual’s minority 
status? It seems to us that an employer that truly regards an 
employee’s minority status as merely accidental in that way will be 
highly unlikely to be the kind of actor that would engage in open 
discrimination. We are also inclined to believe that our imagined 
“postracial” employer, even if it did not affirmatively tout diversity 
ideals, will likely want to avoid developing a reputation of hostility to 
diversity and so at least to that extent would in fact be sensitive to its 
reputation in that regard. Thus, even in the case of the postracial 
employer who “accidentally” engages in showcasing, the signal will 
still be a reliable predictor of a disinclination to discriminate and a 
sensitivity to its diversity reputation. 
The next question is why observers would care about the 
showcasing signal as we have described it. If there is no reliable 
correlation between the showcasing signal and conditions of actual 
diversity (or even a genuine interest in achieving diversity), why 
 
 51. Cf. SKYRMS, supra note 18, at 8, 44–45 (stating that the way to measure “the 
effectiveness of the sender’s use of [a] signal[] to discriminate states . . . is to measure the 
extent that the use of that particular signal changes probabilities”). 
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would observers value that signal at all? Several possible answers are 
consistent with our account. One is that it is widely understood that 
robust levels of diversity are not only difficult to test for but also 
difficult to actually achieve in many segments of the employment 
market. Given this systemic reality, observers might come to regard a 
company’s attitudes toward the ideal of diversity, combined with a 
demonstrated capacity for nondiscrimination, as a better indicator of 
what kind of employer it is than the actual level of diversity that the 
company has been able to achieve. 
Another reason that observers might care about the showcasing 
signal, even absent any correlation to genuine diversity, is that for at 
least some (perhaps many) observers who are considering entering 
into a relationship or transaction with a company, what matters on 
the issue of diversity is not whether the company genuinely has it, but 
whether associating with the company creates risks of being 
victimized by discrimination or of suffering vicarious reputational 
harm as a result of that company’s misdeeds. What such observers 
may seek is reliable evidence that the company’s orientation on 
matters of workplace equality is within socially acceptable limits. The 
showcasing signal provides precisely such comfort, insofar as it 
assures that the company does not engage in open discrimination and 
is sensitive to its reputation on diversity matters. 
A third, more troubling possibility is that certain kinds of 
showcasing behaviors, in combination with an obvious lack of 
meaningful levels of actual diversity in the company’s workforce, 
might signal that while the company is aware of the social significance 
of diversity and is sensitive to its reputation on that score, the 
company has not sought to implement meaningful measures or 
structural reforms that would actually produce robust levels of 
workplace diversity. It is possible that observers who feel threatened 
by such affirmative measures and reforms but who wish to avoid a 
reputation for hostility to diversity ideals would view the showcasing 
signal in the absence of genuine diversity in a positive light; that is, as 
an assurance that while the company is aware of social norms 
recognizing the importance of diversity as an ideal, it still otherwise 
manages its workforce in a relatively conservative, colorblind fashion. 
IV.  NORMATIVE AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 
We have argued that diversity as such is not the kind of 
characteristic that can function effectively as a signal,52 and we have 
 
 52. See discussion supra Part II. 
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suggested that the putative signaling behavior that is commonly 
observed in the context of corporate hiring is more accurately 
characterized as the showcasing of individuals who ostensibly increase 
the diversity of the organization in some respect.53 Because this 
showcasing behavior is not a reliable signal of the actual existence of 
the sort of diversity that could, in turn, be evidence of an ethos of 
fairness, nondiscrimination, and equality, we have proposed that such 
behavior might be understood as a signal of the company’s ability to 
attract and disinclination to discriminate against members of the 
showcased individual’s minority group, and a sensitivity to its 
reputation on diversity matters.54 
All of the foregoing discussion has been primarily concerned 
with trying to explain the corporate interest in increasing or touting 
its workforce diversity in highly visible ways, such as by placing 
women or members of minority groups in high-ranking positions like 
the board of directors. In this last section, we take a more normative 
turn and apply a critical perspective to the instrumental, showcasing 
approach to diversity we have been describing. We explore potential 
criticisms from within the perspective that regards diversity as 
something that we have reason to value evidentially; that is, as a 
manifestation of the proper functioning of those institutions that 
actually have it and then from the perspective of Title VII’s 
prohibition of workplace discrimination. 
A. General Normative Considerations 
The claim that a particular behavior provides a signal of some 
hidden state is primarily a descriptive claim about the informational 
content of certain social practices,55 consisting partly in an appeal to 
shared social understandings of common behaviors, and partly in a 
quasi-conceptual or interpretive analysis of the more-or-less 
inexorable implications of those behaviors.56 The claims that we have 
made to this point about showcasing have been, in any event, in this 
vein.57 Furthermore, the signaling value of showcasing can be, as 
explained above, independent of an employer’s actual reasons for 
engaging in it.58 Thus, assigning a signaling function to a particular 
 
 53. See discussion supra Part III. 
 54. See supra text accompanying notes 47–49. 
 55. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 18, at 18–22; Broome & Krawiec, supra note 8, 
at 447–50. 
 56. See supra text accompanying notes 47–48. 
 57. See supra Part III. 
 58. See supra text accompanying note 51 (explaining how even accidental showcasing 
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behavior does not necessarily imply that sending the signal is the only 
possible reason for engaging in that behavior. Once the signaling 
function of a particular behavior in a given context becomes 
understood, however, it becomes likely that actors will engage in that 
behavior for the specific purpose of sending the associated signal. 
Presumably, employers and their various observers recognize the 
signaling content of showcasing. This opens up the possibility that 
some employers engage in that behavior for the specific—and 
perhaps exclusive—purpose of sending the associated signal. When 
an employer acts in this way—that is, when it seeks to rationalize its 
showcasing behavior in terms of its signaling function—it is implicitly 
making a claim that the behavior is justified by that function; that is, 
that the signaling function provides good reasons for that behavior. 
That sort of claim is plainly a normative one that warrants critical 
examination.  
Potentially the most serious objection to showcasing for the 
purpose of signaling is that this way of understanding the action 
evinces a lack of respect for the individuals who are so showcased. 
Treating the significance of an employer’s relation with such 
individuals as dependent primarily on their signaling value, their 
value as instruments of implicit communication, is corrosive to their 
status in the organizational community.59 For an employer to regard 
its reasons for minority hiring, for example, as reducible to the value 
that such hiring has in signaling the employer’s ability to win such 
hires in a competitive marketplace is to come dangerously close to 
regarding the worth of a minority hire as something akin to that of a 
prized trophy: valuable as an emblem of the effort required to win it, 
but not something that possesses any value in itself. This is an 
objectionable way of regarding any person. The idea of using persons, 
by dint of the racial or other social categories to which they belong, as 
 
might still function as an effective signal of nondiscrimination and reputational concern). 
 59. Our point is slightly different from the argument, commonly heard in the 
affirmative action context, that race-conscious preference can have a “backlash” effect or 
create a “stigma” for minority groups. See, e.g., Christopher A. Bracey, The Cul de Sac of 
Race Preference Discourse, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1275–93 (2006); Jack Greenberg, 
Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Confronting the Condition and Theory, 43 B.C. L. 
REV. 521, 582–89 (2002); Angela Onwuachi-Willig et al., Cracking the Egg: Which Came 
First—Stigma or Affirmative Action?, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1299 passim (2008); Kathleen M. 
Sullivan, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.: The Backlash Against Affirmative Action, 
64 TUL. L. REV. 1609, 1622–24 (1990). The backlash/stigma argument boils down to a 
claim that preferential treatment can exacerbate negative stereotypes and attitudes toward 
minorities. See Green, supra note 4, at 644–45. What we argue is slightly more abstract: 
that treating an individual as mere signal amounts to a failure to see the individual as a 
person of respect. 
SHIN.PTD 3/30/2011  10:12 AM 
2011] SHOWCASING DIVERSITY 1041 
 
mere emblems or trophies—indeed, as nothing more than living 
certificates attesting to an employer’s good will and effort—entails a 
failure of moral respect for those individuals. To rationalize minority 
hiring as a form of signaling is blatantly to reduce the value of 
minorities who are hired to their functional status as passive emblems 
rather than as actively contributing members of the community. The 
signaling rationale, understood as a putative reason for diversity-
oriented employment practices, views minority hires as purely 
instrumental means to the accomplishment of the employer’s further 
business objectives rather than as ends in themselves, members of a 
cooperative enterprise entitled to moral consideration and concern.60 
An additional, related objection to the justification of minority 
hiring specifically for the purpose of sending the showcasing signal is 
that this way of thinking about the value of such hiring is potentially 
counterproductive to the proper internalization of nondiscriminatory 
attitudes throughout the workplace.61 To the extent that the 
justification of high-profile minority hires in terms of the signal that 
such actions would send tends to displace justifications in terms of the 
merits of the individuals hired, one might worry that reliance on the 
signaling rationale might invite an implicit assumption that those 
hiring decisions would not have been justified on the substantive 
merits,62 which might in turn have negative consequences for the 
individuals hired63 and be detrimental to the promotion of genuinely 
shared, internalized attitudes of mutual respect and equality of 
concern among all members of the workplace.64 
Paradoxically, then, to rationalize the practice of diversity hiring 
as a form of signaling undercuts the basic premise that animates the 
evidential view of the value of diversity. This view regards the 
existence of diversity in certain institutional settings as valuable 
 
 60. To be clear, this is an objection to thinking of showcasing behavior, such as the 
hiring of women or minorities for prominent positions, as justified by its signaling 
function. The point is not that such behavior is unjustifiable, but that the signaling 
rationale does not provide good reasons for it. 
 61. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role of 
Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893, 1893–94 
(2009). 
 62. See, e.g., Green, supra note 4, at 599. 
 63. See id. (citing David B. Wilkins, From “Separate is Inherently Equal” to “Diversity 
is Good for Business”: The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the 
Black Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548, 1597–98 (2004)) (discussing feelings of exploitation 
that can result when an individual believes he was hired solely for signaling purposes). 
 64. See Madeline E. Heilman, Affirmative Action’s Contradictory Consequences, J. 
SOC. ISSUES, Winter 1996, at 105, 107–08 (arguing that race- or sex-based preferences in 
hiring can be deleterious to workplace equality). 
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because it evidences the operation of a socially progressive ethos of 
equality, fairness, and nondiscrimination.65 The signaling rationale for 
the practice of showcasing diversity, because it embeds a conception 
of the individuals being showcased as passive instrumental emblems 
whose value has little to do with their active agency, and because it 
might be corrosive to the sort of internal attitudes that we should 
want to promote in the workplace, seems incompatible with that 
ethos. 
We are not denying that the diversity of a population within an 
institutional setting may be regarded as good partly because it 
evidences certain good things about the institution. Diversity in 
certain contexts is surely a state of affairs that is at least to some 
extent symptomatic of institutional adherence to norms of 
nondiscrimination and a commitment to fairness and equality of 
opportunity. This evidential value of diversity, however, does not 
immunize from criticism every action that tends to bring it about. 
Diversity may be a symptom of the observance of norms that we 
value, but it obviously does not follow that those norms justify all, or 
even any, means of creating that symptomatic state of affairs. A wet 
nose may be a symptom that a dog is in good health, but it does not 
follow that concern for a dog’s health provides good reason to splash 
water on its nose. Doing so might make it appear to observers that 
the dog is healthy, but (for all we know) it might actually harm the 
dog. Similarly, an institution that hires minority personnel for their 
showcase value might succeed in signaling that the institution is 
healthy in certain ways, but the attitudes implicit in that way of 
thinking about the value of those persons seems morally pernicious. 
Given how apparent it is that the signaling rationale for 
showcasing diversity is objectionable on the grounds that it is 
inconsistent with moral respect for persons and potentially 
counterproductive to the internalization of antidiscrimination norms, 
why is the practice so much in vogue? We suspect that all of us have 
personal acquaintance with hiring decisions in our own institutions 
that have at least a flavor of showcasing. We would venture, 
moreover, that most of us have acquiesced to, facilitated, participated 
in, and maybe even celebrated those very practices. Is there anything 
to be said in their defense? 
It bears repeating that our objection to the signaling rationale as 
a justification for what we have been calling showcasing does not 
entail a general objection to all employment practices that might be 
 
 65. See Shin, supra note 11, at 1195–99. 
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characterized as showcasing. The inadequacy of the signaling function 
as a reason for appointing a woman or a minority individual to the 
board of directors obviously does not mean that there are no good 
reasons. Nor does our rejection of the signaling rationale as 
justification for such an appointment imply that the candidate’s status 
as a woman or as a minority cannot provide good reason for it. The 
objection to the signaling rationale is that it implies a morally 
offensive way of thinking about the value of diversity-oriented hiring 
or promotional practices. It is not a claim that race- or gender-
conscious hiring cannot be justified, and we have no interest in 
putting forward such a claim. 
Consider, for example, the argument that certain race-conscious 
hiring practices are justified because they are good for the institutions 
that practice them, or good for society overall.66 A possible 
consequence of the appointment of a minority individual to a very 
visible corporate position such as the board of directors is that it 
might empower the individual to work as a role model for future 
generations of historically underprivileged minorities, who might 
otherwise have abandoned as futile the sort of personal commitment 
required to achieve that kind of success.67 The desirability of that 
consequence might be thought to provide a good reason for 
appointing a person of color, as opposed to a nonminority, to the 
position in question, and then showcasing that person to outside 
observers. 
A similar argument is that the appointment of minority 
personnel to visible positions within the workforce might have certain 
desirable psychological “debiasing” effects.68 According to social 
psychological research highlighted by Jerry Kang and others, 
increasing the direct exposure and contact that employees have with 
members of minority groups can have the consequence of reducing 
the influence of implicit biases on workplace decision making and in 
the context of other interaction involving members of historically 
excluded minority groups.69 Again, the desirability of that sort of 
consequence might be thought to provide good reasons for various 
 
 66. For a review of such arguments, see Shin, supra note 11, at 1191–95. 
 67. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003) (suggesting that the presence of 
diversity in elite institutions could create a visible “path to leadership” for underprivileged 
minorities); see also Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and Future, 20 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 30–32 (2002) (discussing the “role model” argument for 
affirmative action). For further discussion of Grutter, see infra Part IV.B. 
 68. See, e.g., Kang & Banaji, supra note 6, at 1101–02. 
 69. See id. 
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kinds of diversity hiring practices—the same kinds of practices to 
which we might tend to attach signaling value. 
These consequentialist justifications for showcasing diversity are 
not objectionable in the same way that the signaling rationale seems 
to be. They do not involve regarding minority hires as passive 
emblems whose value is unrelated to their active agency. Regarding 
someone as a role model implicates pride, respect, and admiration for 
the individual so cast as a moral agent.70 Regarding someone as a 
“debiasing agent” does imply a more overtly instrumentalist 
perspective, but the notion of debiasing is ultimately about 
normalizing the way in which members of the workplace relate to 
each other, presumably including the “debiasing agents” themselves. 
At least in this way, the debiasing rationale does not regard minority 
personnel as mere tokens, or passive instruments of transmission, but 
rather as persons who, by their interactions in the workplace, have a 
capacity to change the way that others relate to them (and by some 
process of psychological habituation, to all minorities). 
Still, there is little question that these consequentialist 
justifications for diversity-based hiring practices have a decidedly 
peculiar character, at least from the perspective of the evidential view 
of the value of diversity. The basic idea of the debiasing rationale, for 
example, is that by taking affirmative measures to make itself more 
diverse, an employer might enjoy, as salubrious side effects, the 
promotion of nondiscriminatory attitudes in its workplace71—the very 
sort of attitudes that the existence of diversity is supposed to 
evidence. Whether or not the desired attitudes will in fact result from 
the diversity that is created is an empirical question on which we do 
not take any particular position here. There is perhaps a lingering 
worry that the use of diversity-based hiring in order to bring about 
desirable attitudes among the workforce has a certain character of 
manipulation, as of social-psychological engineering. Maybe in the 
end, the worry is not well founded; it is not as if such practices involve 
deception or coercion.72 Perhaps such practices are precisely what are 
 
 70. Cf. Schuck, supra note 67, at 30–32 (supporting the role model justification for 
affirmative action). But cf. Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action as a Majoritarian Device: 
Or, Do You Really Want to Be a Role Model?, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1222, 1226–29 (1991) 
(critiquing the role model justification for affirmative action).  
 71. See Kang & Banaji, supra note 6, at 1101–15 (explaining the “social contact 
hypothesis,” “countertypical exemplars,” and “debiasing agents”). 
 72. Indeed, insofar as actors in the workplace freely and reasonably consent to 
whatever particular instrumental roles they are asked to fulfill (presumably for the 
ultimate purpose of maximizing the firm’s profits or otherwise advancing its mission), the 
objection of exploitation or disrespect loses much of its force. The signaling rationale is 
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necessary to make further progress toward our shared goals of a truly 
nondiscriminatory workplace and conditions that constitute genuinely 
fair equality of opportunity. And perhaps the sort of active, visible 
behavior that we have characterized as showcasing is what will most 
likely lead actors in all workplaces to fully internalize the norms of 
nondiscrimination that are necessary to achieving meaningfully 
robust and durable conditions of diversity.73 But that too is an 
empirical question. And, more relevantly to our point, that sort of 
justification is not objectionable in the same way that the signaling 
rationale is. 
B. Legal Justifications 
In this final section, we note the unsettled nature of the legality 
of making decisions to hire minority personnel on the basis of what 
they would add to the visible diversity of the employer’s workforce; 
that is, their showcase value, and discuss how such practices fit in the 
legal landscape.74 
The Supreme Court laid the foundation of its approach to 
affirmative action under Title VII in United Steelworkers of America 
v. Weber75 and Johnson v. Transportation Agency of Santa Clara 
County.76 In those cases, the Court held that it was permissible, under 
certain limited circumstances,77 for employers to consider an 
individual’s membership in a minority group as a positive reason in 
favor of hiring that individual. The concept of diversity as such played 
 
morally offensive insofar as it implicates a view of the showcased individual—a passive 
emblem, a mere trophy—that is inconsistent with moral respect and which we could not 
reasonably ask that individual to accept. 
 73. Cf. Bartlett, supra note 6, at 1936–41 (describing ways in which the law can 
“thwart the internalization process” of nondiscrimination norms). 
 74. These observations about the significance of the interest in diversity to Title VII 
do not specifically apply to appointments to a corporation’s board of directors because 
directors generally are not regarded as employees for purposes of the statute. See generally 
Ann C. McGinley, Functionality or Formalism? Partners and Shareholders as “Employees” 
Under the Anti-Discrimination Laws, 57 SMU L. REV. 3 (2004) (discussing the legal 
definition of an employee). 
 75. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
 76. 480 U.S. 616 (1986). 
 77. In Weber and Johnson, the Court held that a voluntary affirmative action plan was 
permissible under Title VII if it was “designed to eliminate manifest racial imbalances in 
traditionally segregated job categories,” the plan was consistent with the statutory 
objective of “[breaking] down old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy,” did not 
“unnecessarily trammel the interests” of nonbeneficiaries of the plan nor create “an 
absolute bar” to their advancement, and was a temporary measure to eliminate “manifest 
imbalance” rather than a permanent one designed to maintain particular proportions. 
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 628–31 (internal quotation marks omitted) (reciting the elements of 
the Weber test). 
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no explicit role in the basis of the Court’s approval of the affirmative 
action plans in Weber and Johnson.78 The affirmative action plans at 
issue in those cases were justified as a way for employers to break 
free from historical patterns in which minorities and women had been 
actively excluded from, and barred from advancing within, certain 
segments of the workplace.79 Race- and gender-conscious decision 
making was conceptualized as a remedy for gross inequalities of 
distribution, a direct countermeasure to past practices of denying 
employment opportunities based on those factors.80 There was little 
suggestion in the Court’s opinions that increasing the racial and 
gender balance of the workplace was justified by the value of 
diversity as such or any indirect benefits that might be thought to 
derive from diversity.81 The operative notion was instead that 
increasing the workplace representation of groups that historically 
had suffered from exclusion and deprivation could be justified as a 
direct response to the very same problems of unjust denial of 
opportunity and distributive inequality that Title VII was meant to 
address.82 
The notion that race-conscious decision making could be justified 
by an interest in diversity, rather than as a brute remedial measure to 
reverse the effects of historical exclusion, received its first major 
articulation in Justice Powell’s concurrence in Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke,83 which was decided a year before 
Weber.84 In Bakke, which involved a constitutional equal protection 
challenge to race-based affirmative action in a medical school 
admissions policy, Justice Powell argued that the “attainment of a 
diverse student body” constituted a compelling interest that could 
justify the consideration of race as a positive decision-making factor.85 
For Justice Powell, however, the value of diversity in a student body 
 
 78. See id. at 628–42; Weber, 443 U.S. at 204–07. 
 79. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 628–42; Weber, 443 U.S. at 204–07. But cf. Cynthia L. 
Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work: Diversity, Integration, and Affirmative Action in the 
Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 10–14 (2005) (proposing a somewhat 
broader, nonremedial reading of Weber and Johnson). 
 80. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 628–42; Weber, 443 U.S. at 204–07; Estlund, supra note 
79, at 10–14. 
 81. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 628–42; Weber, 443 U.S. at 204–07; Estlund, supra note 
79, at 10–14. 
 82. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 628–42; Weber, 443 U.S. at 204–07; Estlund, supra note 
79, at 10–14. 
 83. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).  
 84. Id. at 265 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 85. Id. at 311–14. 
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was largely derivative of the “discourse benefits”86 that could be 
expected from placing individuals with different social and cultural 
perspectives together in a shared educational environment.87 
Almost twenty-five years later, the Supreme Court revisited the 
diversity rationale as a constitutional justification of educational 
affirmative action88 in Grutter v. Bollinger.89 There, Justice O’Connor 
in her majority opinion endorsed Justice Powell’s suggestion in Bakke 
that the academic discourse benefits that flow from a diverse student 
body could justify the consideration of minority racial membership as 
a factor in admissions decision making.90 Justice O’Connor went 
further, however, by asserting that diversity was valuable not just 
because of expected discourse benefits, but also because the 
promotion of diversity in selective educational institutions would help 
better prepare all students to deal with racial difference in their 
future careers, help realize ideals of democratic inclusion and equal 
citizenship, and perhaps most interestingly for our purposes, to create 
a “path to leadership” and help “cultivate a set of leaders with 
legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry.”91 
Although Grutter did not address the permissibility of race-
conscious decision making under Title VII, it appeared to open up the 
theoretical possibility that the Court might one day92 adapt and 
extend the diversity rationale to that statutory context.93 That 
possibility was somewhat diminished by the Court’s decision in 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 
 
 86. Thomas H. Lee, University Dons and Warrior Chieftains: Two Concepts of  
Diversity, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2301, 2305–06 (2004). 
 87. SCHUCK, supra note 42, at 164–65. 
 88. The Court had, of course, decided a number of constitutional challenges to 
affirmative action plans, but none of those cases raised the issue of whether the diversity 
justification for affirmative action was valid. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) 
(suggesting that the Court’s cases since Bakke “might be read to suggest that remedying 
past discrimination is the only permissible justification” for affirmative action). 
 89. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 90. Id. at 325. 
 91. Id. at 330–32. See generally Patrick S. Shin, Compelling Interest, Forbidden Aim: 
The Antinomy of Grutter and Gratz, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 431 (2005) (analyzing the 
implications of Grutter and Gratz for legal understandings of the value of racial diversity). 
 92. Before Grutter, the Court had granted certiorari in a case that would have directly 
addressed the question of the legality of race-conscious employment decisions based on 
“nonremedial” rationales such as the interest in diversity, but the parties settled the case 
before argument. See Taxman v. Bd. of Educ. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547, 1549–50 (3d 
Cir. 1996) (en banc). 
 93. Cf. Estlund, supra note 79, at 35–36 (considering the implications of Grutter in the 
context of employment under Title VII). 
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1,94 in which a fractured majority invalidated a school district’s race-
conscious procedures for assigning children to particular schools 
within the district.95 Although five members of the Court reaffirmed 
Grutter’s holding that an interest in diversity (in the educational 
context) could justify race-conscious decision making to the extent 
necessary to bring it about, Justice Kennedy in his pivotal 
concurrence argued that the school district’s assignment procedures 
were objectionable because they were too “crude”: they 
“threaten[ed] to reduce children to racial chits valued and traded 
according to one school’s supply and another’s demand.”96 Thus, for 
Justice Kennedy, the value of diversity had to be subordinated to a 
constitutional requirement of respect for persons, and regarding 
individuals as nothing more than bankable chits whose value 
depended on their race violated that requirement.97 
Finally and most recently, in Ricci v. DeStefano,98 the Supreme 
Court considered whether it was permissible, under the prong of Title 
VII that prohibits intentional discrimination (disparate treatment),99 
for a city to scuttle the results of an exam administered to firefighters 
competing for promotions based on a belief that, due to a 
disproportionately low number of minority firefighters receiving 
qualifying scores, the city’s certification of the results might result in 
its exposure to liability under the other prong of Title VII, which 
prohibits employment practices that create differentially worse 
outcomes for members of a particular racial group (disparate 
impact).100 The Ricci case did not involve an affirmative action policy, 
and its actual holding is about the interrelation between the disparate 
treatment and disparate impact paradigms of Title VII.101 The 
particulars of that holding are not important for our discussion here. 
What is noteworthy is that the Court, in an opinion by Justice 
Kennedy, seemed to take for granted that Title VII’s prohibition 
against intentional discrimination requires strict colorblindness in the 
context of employment decision making.102 Whether the Court will 
 
 94. 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 95. See id. at 707–11. 
 96. Id. at 798 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 97. Id. at 797–98. 
 98. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).  
 99. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). 
 100. § 2000e-2(k). 
 101. For general discussion of Ricci, see Zimmer, supra note 7, at 2–8. 
 102. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2673. For example, in arguing that the City of New Haven 
violated the disparate treatment provision of Title VII by taking into account the race of 
the firefighters who scored highly on the qualifying exam, even though the City did this 
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take this assumption seriously in a case that squarely raises the issue 
of affirmative action under Title VII remains to be seen, but Ricci 
should chasten any expectation that the Court will take its next 
available opportunity to extend the diversity rationale for affirmative 
action to justify race-conscious employment action under Title VII. 
Perhaps it will in fact do so, but that result seems far from a foregone 
conclusion.103 
At this juncture, then, the legal status of race- or gender-
conscious hiring practices under Title VII is at best uncertain. What 
seems beyond doubt, however, is that diversity initiatives on the part 
of private employers have expanded over the past few decades.104 
How many of these employer diversity initiatives truly involve 
affirmative action in the sense of preferential treatment on the basis 
of a protected characteristic is not clear, but it seems to us just a 
matter of time before the Court takes up the question of the 
permissible limits of race- and gender-conscious decision making 
under Title VII. The question, in any event, seems ripe for decision. 
What, then, can be said about the legality of an employer’s 
practice of hiring minorities to visible positions for the purpose of 
showcasing its diversity? If the Court decides to move away from 
Weber and Johnson, what should it conclude about the permissibility 
of such a practice under Title VII? If one were to decide the question 
from first principles,105 it might make sense to begin by thinking about 
the basic purposes of Title VII: to make “the workplace . . . an 
environment free of discrimination, where race is not a barrier to 
 
only because it thought it was required to do so by the disparate impact provision of Title 
VII, Justice Kennedy said that the “analysis begins with this premise: The City’s actions 
would violate the disparate-treatment prohibition of Title VII absent some valid defense.” 
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, for Justice Kennedy, the mere fact that the City’s decision to 
reject the results of the firefighters’ exam involved consideration of the race of the 
firefighters was sufficient to make that decision prima facie discriminatory, even though 
that decision was motivated by nothing other than a desire to avoid a racially disparate 
impact. Id. For additional arguments that Ricci effectively reads a requirement of 
colorblindness into Title VII, see Zimmer, supra note 7, at 8–24. 
 103. For an excellent general discussion of the current legal status of nonremedial 
rationales for race- and sex-conscious decision making in the workplace, see Green, supra 
note 4, at 614–28. 
 104. See id. at 596–97. 
 105. Note that the relevant statutory text of Title VII does not itself necessarily militate 
in favor of a requirement of strict colorblindness, Justice Kennedy’s assumptions in Ricci 
notwithstanding. The central liability provision states only that it is “an unlawful 
employment practice” for an employer “to discriminate . . . because of” race, color, sex, 
and so on; but “discriminate” is not itself defined in the statute, let alone defined in a way 
that would require regarding all race- or sex-conscious decision making as constituting 
discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). 
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opportunity”;106 “ ‘to promote hiring on the basis of job qualifications, 
rather than on the basis of race or color’ ”;107 and to “remov[e] . . . 
artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the 
barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or 
other impermissible classification.”108 With these statutory goals in 
view, we can then ask how the Court should evaluate the practice of 
hiring members of underrepresented groups for their signaling or 
showcase value.109 
When one puts the question this way, it becomes clear that the 
signaling rationale for diversity hiring works no better as a legal 
justification than as a moral one.110 If the point of diversity hiring lies 
in its signaling value, then it becomes quite awkward to argue that 
such hiring can be justified as a way of advancing the substantive 
goals of Title VII.111 The argument is awkward because it seems to 
muddle correlation with causation. It might very well be true that 
firms that have more racially and gender-diverse workplaces are 
likely those that treat their employees fairly, equally, respectfully, and 
with all due concern for their individual interests. Encouraging the 
construction of such an environment is surely a central goal of Title 
VII.112 But is that goal served when an employer engages in a practice 
of recruiting high-profile minority or female employees for the 
purpose of making it appear to observers (inside and outside the 
firm) that the employer enjoys that kind of environment?113 Could 
one not argue that this is nothing more than splashing water on the 
dog’s nose so as to make others believe that it is healthy? 
 
 106. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2674. 
 107. Id. at 2675 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434 (1971)). 
 108. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
 109. For a similar but more general inquiry not limited to showcasing behavior, see 
Green, supra note 4, at 614–39. 
 110. See supra Part IV.A. 
 111. Cf. Green, supra note 4, at 621 (arguing that the business interest in “signaling 
fairness” does not justify race- and sex-conscious decision making under Title VII). 
 112. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2674–75; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431; see also Burlington Indus. 
v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998) (discussing Title VII’s goal of encouraging employers 
to take affirmative measures to reduce the risk of discrimination); Faragher v. Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805–06 (1998) (describing the primary purpose of Title VII and the 
responsibilities of both employers and employees). 
 113. David Wilkins discusses this issue in the law firm context, where he asks “Is the 
Business Case for Diversity Good for the Diversity of Large Law Firms?” Wilkins, supra 
note 63, at 1591. Wilkins specifically points to the incentive for these big law firms to cook 
the diversity numbers so as to try to appear more diverse to prospective employees. See id. 
at 1591–99. For firms to spend resources engaging in this kind of window dressing, Wilkins 
argues, does little to advance the goals of racial justice, which presumably is the end goal. 
See id. at 1599–1611. 
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From the perspective of the goals of Title VII, as from the more 
general normative perspective we considered earlier, the signaling 
rationale seems to undermine the justification of diversity-based 
hiring, even though it might explain why in fact employers actually 
engage in it. We should not necessarily conclude, however, that the 
sort of diversity hiring to which employers attach signaling value 
cannot be justified in terms of the goals of Title VII. (Employers 
might be doing the “right” thing albeit for the wrong reasons.) 
Offhand, it seems tempting to believe that the most robust workplace 
diversity is the sort of diversity that arises naturally from merits-
driven employment decision making by actors who have genuinely 
internalized a strong commitment to norms of antidiscrimination and 
equality of opportunity and advancement for all. Diversity on this 
picture is the product or symptom of a process that works from the 
inside, out. 
The difficulty, however, as the social-psychological literature of 
the past fifteen years has established, is that this inside-out model of 
realizing conditions of equality in the workplace may be unrealistic.114 
This model assumes that actors, so long as they have internalized a 
commitment to nondiscrimination, will tend to make employment 
decisions that will naturally tend to increase the diversity of the 
workplace. But this might be false. Implicit biases, unconscious 
stereotyping beliefs, and other hidden psychological factors might 
dispose actors to make decisions that tend to limit diversity rather 
than increase it, even while the actor genuinely professes a 
commitment to equality and diversity.115 It might be that the only way 
to eradicate those persistent, stubborn, and hidden biases is to work 
from the outside, in. This is what we understand to be the point of the 
debiasing strategy that scholars like Jerry Kang and Christine Jolls 
have discussed.116 On the outside-in model, diversity is a means, a 
psychologically effective tool for eliminating implicit bias, which in 
 
 114. See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 6, at 962; Kang & Banaji, supra note 6, at 
1064. 
 115. See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 6, at 962; see also David L. Faigman et al., A 
Matter of Fit: The Law of Discrimination and the Science of Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1389, 1404–05 (2008) (arguing that people are often unaware of significant factors that 
influence their motivations). 
 116. See generally Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 
CALIF. L. REV. 969, 988 (2006) (“In a variety of ways, existing law and policy seek to 
respond to the problem of implicit bias; imaginable reforms could do far more.”); Kang & 
Banaji, supra note 6, at 1077 (“[R]esponding to discrimination means not only remedying 
present acts of discrimination but also preventing discrimination that is likely to occur 
without some proactive action.”). 
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turn would be expected to produce fair decision making that would 
then tend to regenerate that diversity more organically (from the 
inside, out).117 Thus, although the signaling rationale for diversity 
hiring seems unresponsive to the goals of Title VII, it might 
nevertheless be that the very kind of hiring that carries signaling 
(showcase) value might be effective in generating, outside in, lasting 
conditions of fairness and true equality of opportunity in the 
workplace. 
There is also reason to think that if the outside-in model can be 
borne out as an empirical matter, allowing employers to engage in 
diversity hiring will in the long run tend to reduce the efficacy of the 
signaling incentive while improving conditions of equality overall. 
Employers who want to hire minority personnel for showcasing 
purposes will end up giving high wages to (or spend more on 
recruiting) a small group of individuals. To shift a handful of high-
profile women and minorities from one employer to another does not 
do much to raise overall welfare, let alone further social justice, in any 
meaningful sense. Indeed, a market in which such high-profile 
individuals are traded back and forth in zero-sum transfers just for 
their showcasing value exemplifies precisely the sort of attitude that 
was denounced by Justice Kennedy in Parents Involved—treating 
persons as if they were nothing more than racial “chits” to be 
collected and traded for purely derivative value.118 But one can expect 
that with sufficient demand, more women and minorities will enter 
the market and be hired by employers who want to mimic their 
competitors who have made similar appointments. If the elimination 
of bias and the realization of attitudes of nondiscrimination really can 
be achieved from the outside in, then this behavior by employers 
might end up producing socially desirable consequences (even though 
the employers would have been acting for objectionable reasons). 
Those consequences include the reduction of implicit bias in 
employment decision making, which would naturally tend to increase 
even further the numbers of workers who had traditionally been the 
victims of such bias. Gradually, the hiring of such a worker would 
cease to seem remarkable and would no longer carry signaling value. 
Ironically, it is perhaps that situation more than any other, that is, the 
state of affairs in which the visible hiring of a minority carried no 
 
 117. See Green, supra note 4, at 604. 
 118. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 798 
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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signaling value in particular, that would indicate true progress toward 
the goals of workplace antidiscrimination laws. 
CONCLUSION 
At bottom, the simple signaling rationale for race- or gender-
conscious hiring stands on shaky justificatory ground as a matter of 
economics, law, and morality. The hiring of minority personnel to 
visible positions for their showcase value—“trophy hiring,” to put it 
crassly—may very well be an effective means of signaling an 
employer’s geniality toward minority groups or women, and its 
sensitivity to the social significance of diversity. But the more 
widespread this sort of showcasing becomes over time, the less 
meaningful the content of the associated signal will be. If most 
employers are engaging in this behavior, the practice begins to 
resemble a norm, and a negative reputational cost attaches to a firm’s 
inability to make a showcase-worthy hire. If everyone is doing it, then 
showcase hiring becomes little more than a precondition to a firm’s 
acceptance into polite society. Maybe this describes the state of affairs 
in which we already find ourselves. On the other hand, maybe we are 
overestimating the prevalence of these practices. (We are not so 
sure.) 
But what we want to drive home is this: as practitioners and 
participants in diversity-oriented hiring practices, we cannot be 
content with justifying those practices in reference to their signaling 
value, as reflected in the increasingly trite idea that they “send a 
positive message.” Our reasons for our diversity-promoting practices 
cannot possibly be so empty, so nonaspirational, and so devoid of 
respect for our fellow colleagues and candidates. To be sure, it is in 
the nature of a signal that we do not control how observers will 
understand our actions. And perhaps it is in our social nature to 
signal others that we are, and we belong to institutions that are, of the 
“good type.” But we must not mistake the signaling value of our 
diversity-hiring practices for reasons that provide adequate 
justification for them. That mistaken view—the view that our 
diversity-oriented efforts are justified by the positive message they 
send about us—is corrosive to the values of respect and equality that 
underlie our concern for diversity in the first place. 
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